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ABSTRACT
This paper presents evidence that the “cost channel” may be an important part of the
monetary transmission mechanism. We argue that if working capital is an essential component of
production and distribution, monetary contractions can affect output through a supply channel as
well as the traditional demand-type channels. We specify an industry equilibrium model and use it
to interpret the results of a VAR analysis. We find that following a monetary contraction, many
industries exhibit periods of falling output and rising price-wage ratios, consistent with a supply
shock in our model. We also show that the effects are noticeably more pronounced during the period
before 1979. 
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I.  Introduction.
Traditional economic models posit that changes in monetary policy exert an effect upon
the economy through a demand channel of transmission.  This view of monetary policy has a
long history that has been fraught with debate over whether monetary policy affects real
economic variables, and if so, how powerful these effects may be.  Much of this research has
been devoted to identification of a demand-side transmission mechanism for monetary policy
and quantifying its effects.  Alternatively, some researchers have proposed that there may be
important supply-side, or cost-side, effects of monetary policy (e.g. Galbraith (1969), Shapiro
(1981), Blinder (1987), Fuerst (1991), Christiano & Eichenbaum (1992), Christiano,
Eichenbaum & Evans (1997) and Farmer (1984, 1988a, b)).  One version of this view, which
ignores long-run effects, has been called the “Wright Patman Effect,” after Congressman Wright
Patman who argued that raising interest rates to fight inflation was like “throwing gasoline on
fire” (1970).
This paper presents industry-level evidence on comovements between prices and output
that suggests that these cost-side theories of monetary policy transmission deserve more serious
consideration.  It is not the purpose of this paper to deny the existence of demand-side effects.
Rather, this paper presents evidence implicating supply-side channels as powerful collaborators
in transmitting the real effects of monetary policy shifts in the short-run.  In fact, for many
important manufacturing industries, the evidence presented here implies that a cost channel is the
primary mechanism of transmission for the first couple of years after a monetary shock.
There are compelling reasons, both theoretical and empirical, to consider the importance
of cost-side effects of monetary policy actions.  Just as interest rates and credit conditions affect
firms’ long-run ability to produce (by investing in fixed capital), they can also be expected to2
affect firms’ short-run ability to produce (by investing in working capital). The value of the
investment in working capital is substantial.  According to the Quarterly Financial Report, the
value of inventories plus trade receivables is approximately equal to the value of net plant,
property and equipment in the combined manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade sector
(1999:II).  Both are equal to approximately three months’ sales.  Additionally, recent empirical
research on the aggregate effects of monetary policy highlights several patterns in the data which
are difficult to explain with the traditional view.
Bernanke & Mihov (1998), Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1994), Bernanke & Gertler
(1995), and others have used vector autoregressions (VARs) to identify monetary policy changes
and to document the reaction of various aggregates to those shocks.  The results of this research
can be summarized in the following “stylized facts” about the effects of a contractionary
monetary policy action:  (1) Output falls after a lag of about four months, bottoming out nearly
two years later, followed by a gradual recovery. (2) Short-term interest rates (including the
Federal funds rate) have largely transitory responses.  Initially higher, they return to previous
levels within nine months.  (3) Most strikingly, the price level is unresponsive for almost two
years, and then begins to decline to a permanently lower level.
Traditional models attempt to explain these facts by assuming that sticky wages or prices
allow monetary policy to affect real interest rates, which then impact consumer and investment
spending.  The crucial theoretical assumption of price stickiness is, however, subject to
continued debate.  It is difficult to explain why a decline in aggregate demand driven by a money
shock does not lead firms to lower their prices, given reasonable assumptions on the cost of
changing prices and forward-looking behavior.   Furthermore, as this paper will demonstrate,3
these models are inconsistent with the industry-level response of prices for many manufacturing
industries.
Another problem with the demand-only view of monetary transmission, noted by
Bernanke & Gertler (1995), is the degree of amplification.  Empirical evidence suggests that
monetary policy shocks that induce relatively small movements in open market interest rates
have large effects on output.  Bernanke & Gertler use this result to support their argument that a
credit channel working in tandem with the traditional monetary channel explains the data better.
An alternative (or complementary) means to explain the observed amplification is to allow
monetary policy shocks to have both supply-side and demand-side effects.  If this is the case,
then a shock to monetary policy could be viewed as shifting both the aggregate supply and
aggregate demand curves in the same direction, leading to a large change in output accompanied
by a small change in prices.
The literature offers several theoretical foundations for monetary policy as a cost shock.
For example, Bernanke & Gertler’s (1989) model contains both a demand and supply component
of balance sheet effects.  Several other credit channel papers suggest that there might be a cost-
side channel of monetary policy (e.g. Kashyap, Lamont, & Stein (1994), Kashyap, Stein &
Wilcox (1993), and Gertler & Gilchrist (1994)).  Most of these papers are empirical, and do not
explicitly model the supply-side effects.  Nevertheless, the discussion of the results indicates the
possibility of supply-side effects.  Consider, for example, Gertler & Gilchrist’s (1994) study of
the cyclical properties of small versus large firms, in which they show that a monetary
contraction leads to a decrease in the sales of small firms relative to large firms.  The implication
is that tight credit is impeding the ability of small firms to produce.
1
                                                          
1 Some earlier empirical work studied whether rises in interest rates are passed on to prices. Seelig (1974) found
small or insignificant effects on markups.  Shapiro (1981), on the other hand, estimated a Cobb-Douglas markup4
There are several other examples of general equilibrium macroeconomic models that
explicitly analyze the supply-side effects of monetary policy through working capital.  Blinder
(1987), Christiano & Eichenbaum (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (CEE) (1997) and
Farmer (1984, 1988a, b)) all begin with the assumption that firms must pay their factors of
production before they receive revenues from sales, and must borrow to finance these payments.
In most of the models, an increase in the nominal interest rate serves to raise production costs.
Thus, a monetary contraction leads to a decline in output through an effect on supply.  It is
important to note that some type of rigidity is still required for money to be non-neutral.  If
prices and portfolios adjust immediately, then monetary policy has no initial effect on interest
rates, so that neither aggregate demand nor aggregate supply shifts.
A clear framework for distinguishing between supply and demand-side effects of
monetary policy is necessary.  Blinder (1987), in exploring the theoretical foundations of this
issue, notes a very simple test of supply-side effects that predicts the results presented here:
“The idea of a supply failure contains a hint of what is to come: if recessions are
initiated by declines in supply, rather than by declines in demand, then prices may
rise, not fall, as economic activity contracts.” (p. 328)
This is precisely what this paper examines at the industry level.  Rising prices in the presence of
falling output is taken as indication of a cost shock, while a positive correlation between these
two quantities identifies a demand shock.  The results confirm that for numerous manufacturing
industries, contractionary changes in monetary policy are primarily cost shocks.
Section II of this paper presents a simple industry equilibrium model of firm costs that is
used as a basis for identification of supply and demand shocks, as well as to evaluate the
                                                                                                                                                                                          
equation on aggregate data and found significant interest rate effects on the price level.  To our knowledge, there has
been little or no recent empirical work on the subject.5
empirical evidence presented in the subsequent section.  Section III presents the vector
autoregression framework and identification scheme used to analyze two-digit level industry
data.  The results of this analysis show clear indications of the strength of monetary policy as a
cost shock.  Many industries display falling output and rising price-wage ratios.  Furthermore,
the effect appears to be much more pronounced during the period from 1959 to 1979.  This is
also the period in which monetary policy shocks have larger and longer effects on output.
Section IV addresses possible alternative explanations of the empirical results presented in the
preceding sections.  Finally, Section V concludes with implications and suggestions for further
research.
II.  A Framework for Identifying Monetary Effects on Industry Output.
One of the main goals of this paper is to develop a test of whether monetary shocks have
a supply-side effect.   Developing such a test on an aggregate basis is difficult, however, unless
one is very sure about the source of monetary non-neutrality.  As pointed out by Christiano,
Eichenbaum & Evans (1997), none of the leading models of monetary non-neutrality is
completely satisfactory.  As a result, there is no consensus on the sources of non-neutrality, and
therefore no standard general equilibrium model for studying the effects.
We circumvent this problem by developing a test based on an industry equilibrium
model.  To be specific, we assume that through some unspecified mechanism, monetary policy
can have effects on an industry’s demand as well as its costs.  We use a simply model of supply
and demand to develop testable implications about the responses of the industry variables to the
various types of shocks.  This approach has several additional advantages.  First, as we shall see,
industry prices tend to move much more than the aggregate price level.  This result is consistent6
with Blanchard’s (1987) findings that industry-level prices adjust much more quickly than the
aggregate price level.  He argues that small lags and staggered price adjustment can cumulate to
create long lags in the aggregate price level.  Thus, it is difficult to interpret movements in the
aggregate price level.  A second advantage of this approach is that it allows for industry
heterogeneity in the possible impact of monetary policy. We would expect monetary policy to
have differential impacts on industries according to the importance of credit conditions for their
demand and supply.  Thus, industry differences can potentially provide additional insights.
The disadvantage of this approach is that we leave unanswered a key question:  how does
monetary policy work in general equilibrium?  While we cannot answer this question directly,
we hope that our more microeconomic study of how monetary policy affects industry supply and
demand will shed light on the larger question.
We propose a simple test that relies on one of the most basic insights from
microeconomics: that the sign of the correlation between output and relative prices can indicate
whether supply or demand is shifting.  We begin by presenting a simple model that incorporates
supply and demand effects of monetary policy.  We then discuss how various generalizations
might change the predictions.
 Consider a representative firm in industry i.  Suppose the firm maximizes profits given
by:
(1)  () it it it it it it PQ RWCQ p =-
where Pit is the price of output, Qit is production, Rit captures the supply-side effects of monetary
policy, Wit is the wage and C(Qit) is a convex cost function.  This formulation of costs is similar7
to that used by CEE.  In their set-up, Rit is the gross interest rate, which multiplies costs because
firms must borrow to pay their wage bill at the beginning of the period and then repay the loan at
the end of the time period at the gross interest rate R.
We normalize the number of firms to be equal to unity. Suppose the industry inverse
demand curve is given by:
(2)  (,) , 0 , 0 it it it Q D Pf Q D w h e r e f f =< > ,
and where Dit is a demand shifter.  Shifts in Dit capture the demand effects of monetary policy
for industry i.  We also allow for wages to be endogenous, i.e.,
(3) (,,) , 0 , 0 , 0 . it it it it Q D R W N Q D R where N N and N =³ ³ £
This wage function captures three possible effects:  (1) the industry may face an upward sloping
labor supply curve (captured by the assumption that NQ ³  0); (2) the demand shifter D may be
correlated across industries, so that a rise in D may increase the economy-wide demand for labor
and hence raise the marginal cost of workers to this industry (ND ³ 0); (3) a rise in R may
increase costs and hence lower labor demand in other industries, thus lowering the marginal cost
of employing workers in this industry (NR £ 0).
It is straightforward to show using comparative statics that in the competitive industry
equilibrium the following results obtain (the details are given in the theoretical appendix):8
1  A negative demand shock (i.e. a decline in Dit) leads to lower equilibrium output Qit and
lower equilibrium prices relative to wages, Pit/Wit, as long as the decline in Dit shifts the
industry inverse demand curve down by more than it shifts the industry inverse supply
curve.
2  A negative supply shock (i.e. a rise in Rit) leads to lower equilibrium output Qit but higher
equilibrium Pit/Wit as long as the net effect of the rise in Rit is to raise the inverse industry
supply curve.
The conditions ensure that the effect of the particular shock on output or prices is not
overwhelmed by any shifts in labor supply to the industry.  For example, with respect to a
decline in Dit, output will only fall as long as wages do not fall so much that the industry supply
curve shifts out more than the demand curve shifts back.  We believe these assumptions to be
plausible.
These results imply that if a monetary contraction affects an industry primarily by
lowering the demand for its product, we should observe a fall in both output and prices (relative
to wages).  In contrast, if a monetary contraction affects an industry primarily by raising its
production costs, we should observe a fall in output accompanied by a rise in prices relative to
wages.  If a monetary contraction affects both supply and demand, then we should observe an
amplified fall in output and an ambiguous effect on the price-wage ratio.
This simple model conveys the basic idea, but abstracts from several potentially
important considerations.  We now consider several of these factors.9
Dynamic Aspects
The simple model presented abstracts from any dynamic elements of production, such as
adjustment costs and inventories.  The addition of these elements, however, does not change the
basic implications of the model.  An earlier version of this paper presented a more complex
model with lags in production scheduling and inventory holding, but with the same implications
for the comovement of prices and output.  The only difference is the various lags introduced.
Our empirical work allows for lags in the estimation and analyzes impulse response functions
rather than just contemporaneous correlations.  Thus, timing issues should not affect our
analysis.
Materials Prices
Our simple model also abstracts from another potentially important part of marginal cost:
materials prices.  If monetary policy responds to incipient warnings of inflationary pressures,
such as rises in raw materials prices, then a monetary contraction could be correlated with rises
in output prices for reasons completely apart from any supply-side effects of monetary policy.
To be specific, if both output prices and monetary policy respond to rises in raw materials prices,
then we could observe rising output prices during a monetary contraction even if there were no
supply-side effects of monetary policy.  In fact, as we will discuss in more detail in the next
section, this point is related to what has become known as the “price puzzle.”  We deal with this
issue in the empirical work by controlling for raw materials prices.
Overall, these results give a rather clean test of a shock’s origin.  If output is falling with
declining prices, then one should conclude that the shock is from the demand side.  However, if10
one observes rising prices accompanying declining output, this is an equally clear indication of a
cost-based shock.
Where this test becomes uninformative is in the presence of both demand and cost shocks
of relatively equal strength.  In this case, the effect on prices is indeterminate, and quite possibly
flat.  In an economy with no price frictions declining output in the face of flat prices would be
taken as evidence of the presence of both shocks, depending on the relative elasticities of the
supply and demand curves.  Alternatively, one could explain such results with sticky price
arguments.
This indeterminacy is not a problem, however, if the cost channel of transmission is
sufficiently large relative to the demand channel.  In this case, one should be able to test for
rising prices in the presence of falling output.  We will see in the empirical results of the
following section that this appears to be the case for a significant number of industries.
It should be clear that our model makes no predictions about the aggregate price level
since it does not specify the source of nonneutrality of money. The only price implications are
for relative prices.
To summarize, the comovements between industry output prices relative to industry
wages and production can potentially indicate the channel through which monetary policy affects
that industry.  If prices are observed to rise significantly as output falls significantly, one can
reject the traditional null hypothesis that monetary policy is strictly (or even most importantly) a
demand-related shock.  The subsequent section in this paper provides details on how a shock to
monetary policy is identified, and presents the results of a test of this hypothesis for aggregate
manufacturing, durable manufacturing, non-durable manufacturing and two-digit manufacturing
industries.11
III.   An Empirical Test of Monetary Policy as a Supply Shock.
A.  Empirical Framework.
To test whether monetary policy has important supply-side effects, one could estimate a
structural model similar to that presented in the last section to directly gauge monetary policy’s
affect on the Rt and the Dt terms.  The disadvantage of such a method is that the results are likely
to be sensitive to model specification and estimation method.  Given the very simple and clearly
testable implications developed in the last section for the comovement of relative prices and
output, this approach is unnecessary.  Vector autoregressions and their associated impulse
response functions provide a convenient method for testing hypotheses about the dynamic
movement of the endogenous variables of a system to exogenous shocks.
As noted in Section I, many researchers have used VARs to identify monetary policy
actions and, almost uniformly, these researchers measure a monetary policy shock as an
innovation to the Federal funds rate (hereafter FFR) after controlling for the Federal Reserve’s
“feedback function,” or the endogenous reaction of the Federal Reserve to movements in
important economic series.
2  This paper follows the work of Bernanke & Blinder (1992) and
Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1994) (CEE).  The main reasons for choosing their
identification scheme is that its relatively simple partial identification scheme allows for control
of the so-called “price puzzle” and flexibility in examining the responses of individual time
series to monetary policy shocks.
                                                          
2 Strongin (1995) points out that the Federal Reserve does not control the Federal Funds rate, but it does control
access to the Discount Window, and hence the ratio of Non-borrowed to Total Reserves.  He argues that this ratio
should then be used to measure monetary policy.  However, Christiano et al (1994) show that VARs using the
Federal Funds rate to identify monetary policy changes yield qualitatively similar results to Strongin’s measure, but
have smaller standard errors.12
The price puzzle, noted by Eichenbaum (1992) and by Sims (1992), is the finding that
aggregate prices rise following a monetary contraction identified by the unexplained portion of
the Federal funds rate.  Under the traditional view of a demand driven transmission mechanism,
this appears to be a puzzle.  The proposed solution to this puzzle is that the Federal Reserve
possesses better information about coming inflation than is captured in a parsimonious VAR and
reacts appropriately.  CEE, following Sims (1992), improve their VARs information set by
including commodity prices as a leading indicator of inflation to which the Federal Reserve
passively responds.  CEE demonstrate that this eliminates the price puzzle (note that this is not
true in pre-1979 sub-samples; see Part C of this section), and produces the flat prices referred to
in Section I.
This paper will argue that the price puzzle may not be an enigma at all, since it ignores
the possibility that the monetary transmission mechanism itself has cost effects.  Prices should
rise in the short-run following an unanticipated monetary contraction if the cost effects of the
monetary transmission mechanism dominate the demand effects.  However, in the interest of
conservatism, this paper follows CEE by controlling for the price puzzle.  Additionally, the
empirical work here explicitly controls for exogenous oil shocks to prevent the cost effects of oil
from tainting the results.
The CEE approach is designed to account for the “feedback function” of the Federal
Reserve (Fed) in identification of policy shocks.  The idea is that the Fed observes
contemporaneous values of important aggregate series such as output, prices, commodity prices
and demand for reserves before targeting the Federal funds rate (FFR), which is assumed to be
the policy instrument of the Fed.  Thus, the portion of the FFR which is orthogonal to these
“feedback” variables is assumed to be an exogenous shift in policy.  Further, the identification13
scheme assumes that these changes in policy do not affect the other aggregate variables in the
system contemporaneously.
These identifying assumptions only partially identify the system.  This partial
identification strategy is achieved through recursive ordering and the use of a Cholesky
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals as the rotation matrix of the
system.  By ordering “feedback” variables before the FFR, one allows contemporaneous effects
on the FFR, but not the reverse.  CEE then order equations for variables of interest following the
FFR equation, assuming that data other than output, prices, commodity prices and demand for
reserves do not have similar feedback potential, and that Fed policy affects such a variables
immediately.  These assumptions are particularly hard to dispute when working with monthly
data as this paper does.
The key advantage of this partial identification is that since we have assumed Fed policy
does not have contemporaneous effects on the “feedback” variables in the system, the ordering
of those variables within the macro-equation block is irrelevant.  There is no need to make
assumptions about the contemporaneous affects of aggregate production on commodity prices or
vice versa.
There are three crucial differences between our empirical model and that of Christiano et
al.  First, we follow the FFR equation by two equations for variables of interest, one for industry
output and one for the industry price-wage ratio.  Second, we include dummy variables in each
equation to control for the cost effects of oil shocks.  As Hamilton (1983, 1996b) points out, all
but one U.S. recessions since World War II have been preceded by an oil price shock.  Further,
Hoover & Perez (1994) note that identified (negative) monetary policy shifts are highly
correlated with these oil shocks.  We control for the cost effects of oil shocks using an approach14
similar in spirit to that of Bernanke, Gertler & Watson (1997) by including dummy variables in
each equation that take the value one during a “Hoover & Perez date” and zero otherwise
3.
Based on Hamilton’s (1985) evidence that oil price shocks take an average nine months to
induce recessions, we include current and twelve lags of the Hoover & Perez dummies.
Additionally, in the interest of more efficient estimation and consistent identification, the
coefficients of the series of interest in the “feedback” variable and FFR equations are constrained
to be zero for each of the industries examined.  This is the approach pursued by Davis &
Haltiwanger (1997), who point out that this is in essence a pseudo-panel data VAR, since the
coefficients of the “feedback” and FFR equations are fixed across regressions, but the
coefficients in the “series of interest” equations are allowed to vary across industries.
To make the above more explicit, consider the following system of seven equations:
(4)   
[]
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Here,  IP t  is the industrial production (a proxy for output),  P t  is the personal consumption
expenditure deflator (a monthly measure of general price levels),  PCOMt is a producer price
index of commodities,  NB TOTt 2  is the log difference of total reserves of the Federal Reserve
system from non-borrowed reserves (as a measure of demand for reserves), FFRt  is the month
end Federal funds rate,  , it Q  is industrial production in industry i, and PWi,t, the ratio of price to
wage in industry i.  SDt  is a matrix of a constant and seasonal dummies and  HP t is a Hoover &
                                                          
3 That is, months identified by Hoover & Perez (1994) as having an exogenous oil supply shock based on their15
Perez dummy.  A is a matrix of endogenous variable coefficients, and following Bernanke,
Gertler & Watson (1997), seven lags are used.  All series are in natural log levels except  FFRt
and those identified as log differences.  Details on data construction are given in the Data
Appendix.
We estimated vector autoregressions of this form for total manufacturing, durable
manufacturing and non-durable manufacturing, 18 two-digit industries and two three-digit
industries within these categories over three sample periods:  the entire period from February
1959 to December 1996, and the two sub-sample periods from February 1959 to September 1979
and from January 1983 to December 1996.  Explicitly, we tested the null hypothesis that the
change in industry price relative to industry wage is less than or equal to zero following a
monetary contraction.  We take rejection of this hypothesis as evidence that a cost channel rather
than a demand channel is the most important avenue of monetary transmission for that industry.
B.  Full-Sample Results.
The results are presented in a series of graphs and tables.  Figures 1A through 1C show
the effect of a positive Federal funds rate shock on the price-wage ratio and output for the
manufacturing aggregates as well as the individual two and three-digit industries using our entire
sample for estimation.  For 13 of the 21 industries examined and for all three aggregates, the
impulse response functions show that in response to a positive shock to the Federal funds rate
output falls and prices rise relative to wages.  Columns two and three in Table 1 summarize the
results by describing the behavior of the data during the first 24 months for each industry.  Table
1 presents the results of a test of the null hypothesis that none of the price levels are significantly
above zero during the first 24 months. The results clearly reject the null hypothesis at the 10%
                                                                                                                                                                                          
reading of Hamilton’s (1985) history of post-war oil shocks.16
level for nine of industries analyzed and we can thus reject the claim that monetary policy exerts
its effects solely through a demand channel of transmission.  In fact, for many important
industries, and even for manufacturing as a whole and for aggregate non-durable manufacturing,
the results indicate that monetary policy’s primary effects on real variables are transmitted
through a supply-side channel.
There is clear evidence of the importance of a demand channel of transmission for only
six industries (Lumber Products, Primary Metals, Fabricated Metals, Other Durables, Food, and
Rubber).  For none of the manufacturing aggregates is there evidence that a demand channel
clearly dominates the supply channel postulated in this paper.
Recall from the results of the theoretical model in Section II that if monetary shocks have
an effect primarily through increases in costs, prices should rise as output falls.  This is exactly
what we observe in Figure 1C.  Look at the price and output responses of Motor Vehicles:  prices
steeply rise and then decay slowly after a peak at nine months;  the output response is nearly the
mirror image, falling to a trough at nine months and slowly increasing from there.
Nor are these unimportant or non-influential industries showing significant cost effects of
monetary policy.  Among those with significant evidence of cost shock effects are Aircraft,
Chemicals & Allied Products, Industrial Machinery, and Textiles.  But these results are not
limited to the industry level. Total manufacturing strongly exhibits supply-side effects, while
non-durable manufacturing shows significant effects.  Taken together this evidence provides a
case for a supply-side channel of monetary transmission that is significantly more powerful in
creating real effects than the often-assumed demand channel.
Some of the industries that exhibit strong cost-side effects run counter to our prior
expectations.  One such example is Motor Vehicles & Parts, which shows a very pronounced17
increase in the ratio of price to wages. One might think that an industry governed by such large
firms would not experience large cost effects of a monetary contraction, since they have easy
access to commercial paper.  One possible explanation is that the primary cost-side effect of a
monetary contraction is through changes in market interest rates, rather than bank loan behavior,
so that even large firms experience significant increases in their costs.  Another possible
explanation is that the small companies that supply parts face loan reductions from their banks.
We will discuss some other examples of differences across industries in the next section in which
we consider alternative explanations for our results.
The heterogeneity of the results across industries raises many questions.  In order to
understand the differences across industries, one must not only measure the differences in the
strengths of the demand and cost channels for each industry, but also the differences in working
capital that would lead monetary policy to have varied cost channel effects.  Factors that might
be important are the role of financing in industry demand relative to industry supply, the fraction
of firms that are bank dependent, and technological and institutional features that affect the time
lag between payments of factors and receipts from sales.   Measurement of these factors is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Our findings on the behavior of price-wage ratios are consistent with those of Christiano,
Eichenbaum & Evans (1997).  These researchers show that a monetary contraction leads to a
decline in real wages in most industries.  They measure the real wage as the industry wage
divided by the GDP deflator, so they are focussing on the real consumption wage.  We instead
focus on the inverse of the real product wage, since we use industry-specific prices.  As pointed
out by Ramey & Shapiro (1998), these two types of wages can behave very differently if relative
prices vary.   The industry equilibrium model presented earlier directs us to study ratios of18
industry specific prices and wages.  Our finding that many industries experience rising price-
wage ratios implies that many industries experience declining product wages.
C.  Sub-Sample Results
We now explore the extent to which the effects we identified may have changed over the
sample period.  To this end, we split the sample into the period February 1959 to September
1979 (the pre-Volcker period) and from January 1983 to December 1996 (the “Modern Era”).
We choose these two sub-samples based on the works of Faust (1998) and Gordon & Leeper
(1994), who report substantial empirical differences between the aggregate effects of VAR-based
identification of monetary policy in these two periods.  Additionally, the choice of these two sub-
samples removes the volatility of monetary policy and economic aggregates experienced
between late 1979 and 1982 from the data.
Figures 2A through 2C show the results for the pre-Volcker period. To conserve space
we do not show the graphs for the “Modern Era.”  The information for both periods is
summarized in columns four through seven of Table 1.
The difference between the two periods is remarkable.  Overall, we see that the early
period through 1979 shows very strong cost channel effects, whereas the later period shows little
evidence of cost channel effects.  In the pre-Volcker period, total manufacturing and durable
manufacturing, as well as nearly every industry exhibit some evidence of a cost channel price
effect.  For both aggregates and for fourteen of the individual industries, the price effects are
significant at the ten percent level.  In contrast, only Lumber and Leather & Hides exhibit
dominant demand channel effects during this period.19
During the “Modern Era,” the cost channel effects are much weaker.  Only nine
industries show significant increases in their relative prices following a monetary contraction.
Furthermore, even in the industries with significant relative price increases, the paths of relative
prices and output are not as clearly consistent with a supply shock as in the pre-Volcker period.
This difference across periods is consistent with the institutional changes that have
occurred.  As has been discussed by many observers (e.g. Friedman (1986)), the financial
structure of the U.S. changed significantly during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  The private
sector financial innovations beginning in the 1970s and the deregulation of the early 1980s led to
more efficient and less regionally segmented financial markets.  The banking and credit
regulations of the earlier period, which limited the scope of lenders and borrowers to respond to
sudden monetary contractions, may have allowed monetary policy to restrict the availability of
working capital.  In the later period, banks and firms had more alternative sources of funds.
A different type of institutional change also occurred over this time period.  Owens &
Schreft (1992) and Romer & Romer (1993) use narrative approaches to show that during the
earlier period, contractionary monetary policy was often accompanied by “credit actions,” in
which the Federal Reserve sought to limit directly the amount of bank lending.  The consequent
non-price rationing led to particularly acute credit crunches which could have led to severe
limitations in working capital.  Thus, well-documented differences in financial markets and
Federal Reserve policy combined with theory postulating the presence of a cost channel of
monetary transmission can explain the variation we see in the effects of monetary policy through
time.
We now present another type of evidence in support of the view that the nature of the
monetary transmission mechanism changed over time. Recall from our earlier analysis that if20
monetary policy shifts both supply and demand in the same direction, the effect on output is
greater than if it shifts only demand. Thus, if the cost channel of monetary transmission were
more important during the earlier sub-period, as suggested by Bernanke & Gertler (1995), we
might expect that the effects of monetary policy on output would be greater in magnitude and
last longer in the earlier period.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate the basic aggregate CEE model for the two sub-
periods (that is, system (4) minus the last two equations).  Because we wish to compare the
magnitude of the response of output to a given shock to monetary policy, we set the innovation
for both periods equal to 25 basis points, the typical interval of change in Federal Reserve
policy
4.
Figure 3 shows the responses of the Federal funds rate, industrial production and the
aggregate price level to a 25 basis point Federal funds shock for the model estimated over each
of the two sub-samples (February 1959 to September 1979 and January 1983 to December 1996)
and the entire sample (February 1959 to December 1996).  Consider first the difference in the
behavior of the Federal funds rate, in Figure 3A.  The peak response during the early period is
slightly higher than the peak response during the second period.  The funds rate returns to its
original level 19 months after the initial shock during the early period and 10 months after the
shock during the later period.  Thus, the impact of a monetary policy shock on the Federal funds
rate is similar in magnitude over the two periods, but has a somewhat longer duration during the
earlier period.
Consider now the impulse responses of output, in Figure 3B.  Comparison of the figures
shows that the trough of output is more than three times as deep during the early period as the21
later period.  Moreover, the duration of the effect on output appears to be much longer during the
early period.  The trough occurs two years after the initial shock during the early period, but only
one year after the initial shock during the later period.  Furthermore, during the early period
output is still well below its previous level even four years after the shock.  During the later
period, output rebounds within two years of the shock to the Federal funds rate.  Thus, both in
magnitude and duration, a given monetary shock had much greater effects during the earlier
period.  The difference in the effects cannot be fully accounted for by the difference in the
response of the Federal funds rate over these two periods.
Finally, consider the behavior of prices in response to a monetary contraction.  Despite
including commodity prices in the reaction function, the price puzzle appears to be fully
operational in the early period.
5  After a contractionary monetary policy shock, prices rise for
over two years before beginning to fall.  In contrast, after a blip up for five months, prices fall for
the most part during the later period.
Our finding that in the pre-Volcker period aggregate prices rise in the short-run following
a monetary contraction is consistent with the results of Hanson (1998).  Recall that Sims’ (1992)
original motivation for including an index of commodity prices in a VAR to identify the Fed’s
feedback function was as a leading indicator of incipient inflation.  Hanson tests a variety of
variables (including commodity prices) that might have power to forecast inflation in a similar
VAR identification of monetary policy functions, and finds that in the pre-1979 sample period
none of these eliminate the price puzzle.  Hanson’s work casts doubt on the now widely accepted
view that the price puzzle is the result of the Fed possessing better information of coming
                                                                                                                                                                                          
4 The standard deviation of the innovation to the Federal Funds rate equation for a regression using the pre-Volcker
sample is 28.5 basis points; for a regression on the modern period sample it is 17.7 basis points; and for a regression
over the entire data sample it is 50.3 basis points.22
inflation than is captured in a simple VAR with aggregate output, prices and monetary policy
variables (like the Federal funds rate). The results of this paper suggest that the real solution to
the price puzzle may lie instead with a cost channel of monetary transmission, which leads to a
short-run increase in prices.  As noted previously, if monetary policy does transmit its effects on
real variables through a cost channel, then rising prices in the short-run following a
contractionary policy shock are not a puzzle.
Thus, three pieces of evidence suggest that the cost channel may have been a more
important part of the monetary transmission mechanism in the period before 1980.  First, the
industry level regressions show that many more industries experienced rising price-wage ratios
and falling output after a monetary contraction.  Second, we appeal to the restrictive regulations
and policy actions during the earlier period as leading to particularly acute credit crunches.
Third, we show that the amplification and duration effects on output and the price puzzle effects
are substantially greater during the earlier period.
IV.  Possible Alternative Explanations.
This section considers four possible alternative explanations of price and output
responses discussed in the previous sections.  The first is that our finding of rising price to wage
ratios is due mostly to falling wages, rather than rising prices.  One possible explanation for why
wages might be more variable than prices is the behavior of overtime hours and the overtime
premium.  Initial cuts in output may involve the elimination of overtime hours which would
imply a decline in average wages.  The second alternative explanation is that we are not
adequately addressing the Fed’s forecasts of future inflation in our estimated reaction function.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
5 And adverse oil shocks too!  Recall the specification (4) includes dummy variables for Hoover & Perez dates.  The
rise in prices during this period is significant at the five-percent level from five months to 21 months following the23
The third alternative explanation, counter-cyclical markups, has been the subject of intense
research in recent years by several authors. Finally, increasing returns to scale potentially could
explain our results.  We discuss each of these possible explanations.
Sticky Prices and Flexible Wages
One possible explanation for the results of this paper is that the price-wage ratio rises in
some industries after a monetary contraction because prices are sticky whereas wages are not.  If
a monetary contraction reduces the demand for an industry’s output, firms respond by lowering
their output and, consequently labor demand.  If, for some reason, prices cannot adjust
immediately but wages can, then wages would fall relative to prices.
We consider this explanation to be less plausible. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1997) show that behavior of profits is inconsistent with a sticky-price model of money.  They
show empirically that profits decline significantly in the wake of a monetary contraction.  In
contrast, a reasonable specification of a sticky price model predicts rising profits in response to a
monetary contraction. Thus, it is unlikely that a sticky-price model can explain these facts.
We can also show direct evidence that this type of model cannot explain our results.
Figures 4A-4C show the separate responses of nominal prices and wages by industry.  We show
the results for the period 1959 to 1979, the period with the strongest rises in the price-to-wage
ratio.  The graphs show that the nominal price level itself rises in virtually all of the industries.
Nominal wages fall in some industries and rise in others, but it is clear that our earlier results are
being driven primarily by the price level.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Federal funds rate shock.24
Expected Future Inflation
As discussed earlier, a leading explanation for the price puzzle is misspecification of the
Federal Reserve reaction function.  In particular, if the Fed changes the Federal funds rate
because it is forecasting future inflation that is not anticipated by a parsimonious VAR, then the
incorrectly specified reaction function will make it look like shocks to the funds rate raise prices.
It may be that industrial production, consumer prices and commodity prices are not sufficient to
capture all of the information used the Fed to forecast future inflation.
The first relevant point is that our main result concerns relative prices, not nominal
prices.  That said, the price/wage ratio may rise due to price puzzle effects if firms respond to
inflation more quickly than does labor.  However, as pointed out earlier, the very reason given
for the price puzzle – the Fed’s better information on future inflation – is called into question by
Hanson’s work.  Despite using sophisticated modern econometric methods and ex post data to
create the inflation forecasts included in his VAR, Hanson is unable to remove the price puzzle
in the pre-Volcker period.
We extend Hanson’s work here by including actual Federal Reserve Board forecasts of
current and future inflation and output in our policy equation.  Romer & Romer (1996) have
compiled a series of past forecasts from the Greenbooks prepared by the Federal Reserve’s staff
prior to each FOMC meeting.  We use these monthly forecasts of inflation and output for the
current quarter and one quarter ahead.  Because the FOMC meetings do not occur every month,
there are several months with missing values for the period 1965:11 to 1979:9.  We filled in the
missing values using the last available forecast.  We included these series as exogenous variables
in the Federal funds rate equation.  In doing so, we are making two assumptions.  First, only the
Federal Reserve has access to its forecasts in the relevant period.  Second, the Fed’s ex post25
policy actions do not change its forecasts in subsequent months.  While the first assumption is
unimpeachable, the second is a bit more dubious.  The Federal Reserve staff likely would change
its forecasts as new information became available, however, this specification should serve as a
convenient benchmark for testing the price puzzle hypothesis that ex ante the Fed possesses
superior knowledge about coming inflation.
Specifically, we estimated equation (4) less the last two industry equations and with the
following modification to the fifth equation for the Federal funds rate:



























+  is the Fed Greenbook forecast for output growth for quarter t+i made in month t,
and similarly, GB P t
ti D
+  is the forecast of inflation.
Figure 5 shows the effect of controlling for the Fed’s inflation forecasts on the aggregate
results.  As the graphs make clear, using a better measure of inflation forecast does not change
the results noticeably.  Aggregate prices still rise significantly in the first two years following an
unanticipated increase in the Federal funds rate.  Thus, it seems unlikely to us that our results
could be explained by a misspecified reaction function.
6
Counter-Cyclical Markups
Counter-cyclical markups have been offered as a possible factor in cyclical fluctuations
in recent years by Rotemberg & Woodford (1991, 1992) and Chevalier & Scharfstein (1996)
among others.  A counter-cyclical markup is a spread between prices and marginal costs (the
markup above marginal cost) that increases in recessions and decreases in booms.  The direct
                                                          
6 The industry level results on price to wage ratio movements are available upon request from the authors, but show
little change from those in figures 2A through 2C.26
link with the evidence presented here is that the above authors often consider the price to wage
ratio to be an accurate measure of markup.  For example, Rotemberg & Woodford (1992) argue
that a theory of counter-cyclical markups is required in order to explain the increase in real
product wages after an increase in military spending.  Subsequent work by Ramey & Shapiro
(1998), however, shows that, in fact, real product wages fall in the wake of a military spending
increase.
Chevalier & Scharfstein (1996) present the most compelling evidence of counter-cyclical
markups in their analysis of the pricing behavior of national, regional and local supermarkets
during national and regional downturns.  They present a model of capital market imperfections in
which firms with low cash flow sacrifice long-term market share in order to raise short-term
profits.  Firms implement this policy by raising their markups.  In the data, Chevalier &
Scharfstein find that leveraged firms do indeed lower their prices less (or raise them more)
during recessions when compared to less leveraged firms.
An equally plausible explanation for the price increases observed for leveraged firms is
that their marginal costs rose due to increased external financing premiums.  In fact, the markup
and cost channel theories are really just variations on a similar theme. The counter-cyclical
markup hypothesis argues that liquidity constraints lead to higher prices because they raise
optimal markups; the cost channel theory argues that liquidity constraints raise prices because
they raise marginal costs.  Without an accurate measure of the marginal costs of these firms
(including financing costs), one cannot tell whether markups are indeed going up with prices, or
whether marginal costs of production and distribution are rising.
This later point applies to the literature of counter-cyclical markups more generally.
Proponents of this line of research fail to demonstrate that markups are indeed counter-cyclical.27
Most consider the ratio of price to wage to be an accurate or at least a reasonable approximation
to the markup.  We argue that if the firm has to finance its production costs, credit is in essence
an input to a Leontief production function where credit is the limiting input whose marginal cost
is the determining factor in total marginal cost (not the wage).
Another point at which counter-cyclical markup models do not fully explain Section III’s
results is that they fail to rationalize why an industry like Transportation Equipment would
exhibit counter-cyclical prices, and an industry like Lumber products would exhibit pro-cyclical
prices.  Both industries are dominated by large industrial firms (General Motors vs.
Weyerhauser), but also have numerous smaller firms (auto parts manufacturers vs. independent
logging mills), so intra-industry market organization and structure should be similar.  Counter-
cyclical markups do not explain why one industry exhibits counter-cyclical prices, but the other
does not.
The hypothesis of this paper can, however, explain this result.  For Transportation
Equipment, cost shocks created by monetary policy are more important in causing output and
price fluctuations than are the associated demand shocks, since financing is likely very important
to undertake production in this industry.  While for Lumber products, the demand channel of
monetary transmission appears more important.  It should be obvious why Lumber would be
more affected by a demand channel.  As mortgage rates rise following a monetary tightening,
construction declines, shutting-off the primary demand for lumber products.  Compared to firm
costs associated with lumber production, this type of demand effect is understandably larger.
Indeed, a direct comparison with Rotemberg & Woodford (1991) is illuminating.
Rotemberg & Woodford seek evidence of counter-cyclical markups in the same two-digit
industries we examine here, and contend that Food, Lumber, Rubber and Primary Metals all28
exhibit counter-cyclical markups.  However, we find that following a monetary contraction,
these four industries have falling relative prices and output.  Further, Rotemberg & Woodford
(1991) find pro-cyclical markups for Paper & Pulp, Apparel, Chemicals, Petroleum and
Electrical Machinery, where we find rising relative prices and falling output in these industries
after a Fed tightening.
Increasing Returns to Scale
Another possible explanation for the results of Section III of this paper is increasing
returns to scale.  Murphy, Schleifer & Vishny (1989) present a business cycle model in which
downward-sloping supply curves generate endogenous fluctuations. Moreover, some estimates
of inventory models indicate declining marginal costs (e.g. Ramey (1991)).
Since an industry supply curve would be downward sloping (over at least some portion)
under short-run increasing returns to scale, a demand-only contraction could be responsible for a
contemporaneous drop in output and rise in prices.  Thus, the empirical results are consistent
with a demand-only channel if supply curves slope down across a wide variety of industries.
The empirical validity of downward-sloping supply curves is controversial, though.  In
work extending Ramey (1991), Bresnahan & Ramey (1994) find that while there are
nonconvexities, they appear to the take the form of fixed costs and lumpiness in production
rather than declining marginal costs.  Shea (1993, p.26) reports in his study of industry level
supply curves that his “results suggest that short-run increasing returns to scale and
countercyclical [sic] price-cost margins may not be particularly important to the cyclical
behavior or manufacturing prices.”  Thus, most would believe that the evidence for downward-
sloping supply curve is not strong.29
V.  Concluding Remarks.
This paper has presented an empirical test that provides evidence to support the
contention that monetary policy has supply-side effects on real variables.  The evidence given
here shows that in key manufacturing industries, prices rise and output falls following an
unanticipated monetary contraction, even after controlling for both the price puzzle and the cost
effects of oil shocks.  Further, the results call into question whether a price puzzle even exists.
We find that the evidence for cost channel effects is much stronger during the period from 1959
to 1979 than from 1983 to 1996.  During the earlier period, many more industries exhibited
rising prices in response to a monetary contraction.  Moreover, the effects of monetary policy on
output were greater and the price puzzle was more pronounced during this earlier period.  These
results are not easily explained by competing theories, and yet are quite naturally and intuitively
explained by treating monetary policy as a cost shock to important industries in the US
Economy.
It is important to note that the results here do not preclude a demand channel of monetary
transmission and the purpose of this paper was not to do so.  This paper examined only
manufacturing industries, and found strong support in these industries for the hypothesis of cost-
side effects of monetary policy.  However, it also found evidence that a demand related shock is
stronger for some industries (notably, Lumber products) than for others.  The important
implication is not that unexpected changes in monetary policy are a cost shock or a demand
shock, but rather that it is a combination of a cost and a demand shock.  This hypothesis is not
only better able to explain the stylized facts than sticky price models, but it is able to explain the
microeconomic level evidence presented herein where traditional models fail.30
Theoretical Appendix:  Comparative Statics Exercises.
The representative firm’s first-order condition for profit maximization is given by:
() it it it it PR W C Q ¢ =××
To obtain the industry equilibrium condition, we substitute the inverse demand function for Pit in
the equation above to obtain:
(,) () it it it it it fQ D R W CQ ¢ =×× .
Totally differentiating these two equations along with the wage equation (3) from the text
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The assumptions on the signs of the derivatives of the f , C, and N functions ensure that the
denominator is positive.  When we allow ND > 0, we must impose extra restrictions in order to
show that both derivatives are positive.  In order for a rise in D to raise Q and P/W, we require
that  () DD i t fN R C Q ¢ >× × .   This condition implies that a rise in D must shift the industry inverse
demand curve more than it shifts the industry inverse supply curve in the neighborhood of
equilibrium Q.  If the opposite held, a rise in D would indirectly raise industry costs so much that
output would fall.
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If we allow NR to be negative, then in order for a rise in R to lower Q we require that the





 be negative.  Thus, we require that
() () it it it R CQ W CQ RN ¢¢ ×> - × ×.   In words, we require that the direct increase in marginal cost due
to a rise in R (the left-hand side) be greater than the magnitude of any fall in marginal cost due to
the indirect effect on wages (the right-hand side).32
Data Appendix.
All regressions in this paper were calculated using data from February 1959 to December
1996, or on sub-samples described in the text.  All series were taken as logarithms except the
Federal funds rate, which was left as a level.  The ratio of non-borrowed to total reserves is
actually the log difference between these two series, and likewise the industry price-to-wage
ratios described in the text are log differences.
The data used for the “Macroeconomic Equations” of the VARs come from two sources.
The index of sensitive commodity prices (PCOM from equation (11)) was obtained from Charles
Evans at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.  All other data were taken from Citibase-DRI.
The Citibase-DRI codes are as follows:  Industrial Production, IP;  Personal Consumption
Expenditure Deflator, GMDC;  Non-borrowed Reserves, FZMRNB;  Total Reserves, FZCMRR,
Federal Funds Rate, FYFF.
Monthly Hoover & Perez dates taken directly from their 1994 paper are:  (1947:12,
1953:06, 1956:06, 1957:02 not in our data sample period) 1969:03, 1970:12, 1974:01, 1978:03,
1979:09, 1981:02, 1990:08.
Industry level industrial production data come directly from the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors.  Industry price data come from two sources.  Where possible, the appropriate PPI
form Citibase-DRI was used.  Where those data were not available, nominal sales and inventory
data (sales where possible, then inventories) were divided by real sales and inventory data to
obtain an industry level deflator.  All sales and inventory data were obtained from the
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Producer price indices were used in the following industries (followed by the Citibase-
DRI code):  Manufactured Goods (82=100, NSA), PWM;  Total Durable Goods (82=100, NSA),33
PWMD;  Lumber & Wood Products (82=100, NSA), PWLU;  Furniture & Household Durables
(82=100, NSA), PWFH;  Motor Vehicles & Equipment (82=100, NSA), PWAUTO; Total
Nondurable Goods (82=100, NSA), PWMND;  Textile Products & Apparel (82=100, NSA),
PWTEX; Apparel (82=100, NSA), PW381;  Pulp, Paper & Allied Products (82=100, NSA),
PWPA;  Chemicals & Allied Products (82=100, NSA), PWCH;  Rubber & Plastic Products
(82=100, NSA), PWRUB;  Hides, Skins, Leather, Related Products (82=100, NSA), PWSK.
For the following industries, prices were inferred from nominal and real sales:  Stone,
Clay & Glass Products, Primary Metals Products, Fabricated Metals Products, Industrial
Machinery & Equipment, Electrical Machinery & Equipment, Transportation Equipment,
Aircraft & Parts, Instruments & Related Products, All Other Durable Goods Industries, Food &
Kindred Products, Petroleum & Coal Products.  For Tobacco Products, nominal and real
inventory data were used to infer an industry price index.
All industry wage data were taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ web page.34
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Industry P/W > 0 Significant P/W > 0 Significant P/W > 0 Significant
Total Mfg. 14 5 24 0 7 2
D u r a b l e s 60 2 0 930
Non-Durables 6 1 14* 1* 7 0
L u m b e r  S I C  2 4 101080
F u r n i t u r e  S I C  2 5 1 4 0 2 31 72 41 0
Stone, Clay & Glass SIC 32 9 1 21 18 19 2
Primary Metals SIC 33 0 0 21 17 0 0
Fabricated Metals SIC 34 0 0 22 9 2 0
Industrial Mach. SIC 35 25 2 14 0 N/A N/A
Electrical Mach. SIC 36 13 0 21 0 12* 2*
Trans. Equip. SIC 37 24 23 19 1 11 0
Motor Veh. SIC 371 24 18 22 14 23 5
Aircraft & Parts SIC 372 24 19 7 0 25 5
I n s t r u m e n t s  S I C  3 8 9 01 602 52
Other Durables SIC 39 0 0 12 1 16 1
Food SIC 20 2 0 24 4* 0 0
Tobacco SIC 21 6 0 23 3* 10 0
Textiles SIC 22 25 9 25 3 1 0
Apparel SIC 23 22 9 16 0 0 0
Pulp & Paper SIC 26 8 3 24 8 13* 0
Chemicals SIC 28 7 3 22* 16* 8 5
Petroleum & Coal SIC 29 17 0 25 19 17 0
Rubber & Plastics SIC 30 0 0 24 15 13 4
Leather SIC 31 0 0 10* 0 2 0
T o t a l  I n d u s t r i e s 1 692 1 1 4 1 79
Total Industries, n>=2 15 8 20 12 16 8
* For these industries, in the periods noted, output may not be falling simultaneously.
Whole Period Pre-Volcker "Modern Era"
Table 1: Number of periods in 1st Two Years P/W (or P/PCE) response is greater 
than zero, significantly (@ 10% level)
37Figure 1A: Industry Output & Relative Price Responses to a Federal Funds Rate Shock
Entire Sample Period: February 1959 to December 1996
Thin line with circles Output; filled significant at 10%, open significant at 25%
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Months Following ShockFigure 1B: Industry Output & Relative Price Responses to a Federal Funds Rate Shock
Entire Sample Period: February 1959 to December 1996
Thin line with circles Output; filled significant at 10%, open significant at 25%
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Months Following ShockFigure 1C: Industry Output & Relative Price Responses to a Federal Funds Rate Shock
Entire Sample Period: February 1959 to December 1996
Thin line with circles Output; filled significant at 10%, open significant at 25%
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Months Following ShockFigure 2A: Industry Output & Relative Price Responses to a Federal Funds Rate Shock
Early Sample Period: February 1959 to September 1979
Thin line with circles Output; filled significant at 10%, open significant at 25%
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Months Following ShockFigure 2B: Industry Output & Relative Price Responses to a Federal Funds Rate Shock
Early Sample Period: February 1959 to September 1979
Thin line with circles Output; filled significant at 10%, open significant at 25%
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Months Following ShockFigure 2C: Industry Output & Relative Price Responses to a Federal Funds Rate Shock
Early Sample Period: February 1959 to September 1979
Thin line with circles Output; filled significant at 10%, open significant at 25%
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Months Following ShockFigure 3: Aggregate Responses to a 25 basis point
Federal funds rate shock, Across Data Samples
Solid line Response using entire sample: February 1959 to December 1996
  Dashed line Response using early sample: February 1959 to September 1979
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Months Following ShockFigure 4A: Industry Price & Wage Responses to a Federal Funds Rate Shock
First Period: February 1959 to September 1979
Thin line with circles Price; filled significant at 10%, open significant at 25%
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Months Following ShockFigure 4B: Industry Price & Wage Responses to a Federal Funds Rate Shock
First Period: February 1959 to September 1979
Thin line with circles Price; filled significant at 10%, open significant at 25%
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Months Following ShockFigure 4C: Industry Price & Wage Responses to a Federal Funds Rate Shock
First Period: February 1959 to September 1979
Thin line with circles Price; filled significant at 10%, open significant at 25%
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Months Following ShockFigure 5: Aggregate Responses to a 25 basis point
Federal funds rate shock, using Greenbook forecasts
Sample Period: November 1965 to September 1979
Thin line with circles standard specification; filled significant at 10%, open significant at 25%
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5C: Response of Consumption Deflator
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